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ABSTRACT 
The ‘backhaul problem’ is characterized by an imbalance in transport flows between locations. This 
problem is usually studied in a perfectly competitive framework, which essentially predicts that when the 
imbalance is sufficiently large, the freight price of transport from low demand regions to high demand 
regions, the so-called backhaul price, drops to zero. This result is inconsistent with empirical observations. 
In this paper, we develop a matching model to address this inconsistency. We argue that market friction, 
through search imperfections due to lack of information by carriers on the (future) demand for transport by 
customers, may play an important role in the determination of backhaul prices. We demonstrate that 
carriers are at least compensated for the time they search for customers, so the backhaul price is in general 
positive. The matching model is numerically applied to the inland navigation shipping market in the Rhine 
river area in Western-Europe. We also analyse the effects of increases in transport costs on transport flows 
and backhaul prices, e.g. due to climate changes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The ‘backhaul problem’ is a well-known phenomenon in transport research, both in freight 
and passenger transport. It refers to the situation where the volume of transported 
goods/persons is not in balance between two (or more) directions, which means that 
goods/persons are mainly transported in one (or more) dominant direction(s). The ‘backhaul 
problem’ is one of the classical research problems, going back to at least the disscussion of 
“joint costs” by Pigou and Taussig (1913). Imbalance in freight transport is extremely 
common (see e.g. Wilson (1987)). This is mainly caused by the fact that aggregate good flows 
between regions differ due to differences in demand. At the most aggregate level, the 
imbalance can be seen in the import/export ratios between pairs of countries. The imbalance 
becomes even more pronounced as carriers are frequently specialised in a certain type of 
freight which generates additional return trips. For example, transport carriers which are 
specialised in the transport of edible oils are generally not allowed to transport other kinds of 
(nonedible) freight. At first sight it may seem that in the passenger market the backhaul 
problem is absent, as nearly all passengers return to their location of origin. However when we 
take the time dimension into account we may note that metros drive full to city centers during 
the morning peak and return almost empty on their return trip (Rietveld and Roson (2002)). 
During the afternoon it is the other way around. The backhaul problem is also standard in the 
taxi market. Generally, there is one high demand location (e.g. airports, city centers) and many 
low demand locations. 
 
Theoretical contributions to the backhaul literature use perfect-competition models (see e.g. 
Felton (1981)), an exception being Rietveld and Roson (2002) who model the price setting of 
a public transport monopolist. To simplify the framework, these studies examine transport 
between two regions. Theories based on perfect competition predict then that above a 
minimum degree of imbalance in good flows, the freight price for transport from the low 
demand region to the high demand region, the so-called backhaul price, will drop to zero.1 
This means that the cost of transport from one region to the other is fully borne by the 
                                                 
1
 This result is the classical result as featured in transport economics textbooks such as Boyer (1998). 
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transport demanding customers2 in the high demand regions. This cost is equal to the round 
trip cost of transport. The result can be made more intuitive as follows. 
 
Suppose a competitive carrier market with free entry of carriers. A large degree of imbalance 
in good flows then is the result of a large difference in demand between the high demand and 
low demand region. Due to the difference in demand the cost of transport will be allocated 
differently between customers from high and low demand regions. Above a minimum degree 
of imbalance, an overcapacity of supplying carriers will arise in the low demand region, so 
some carriers return empty, whereas other carriers return with freight. Under the perfect 
competition assumption and the absence of loading costs, backhaul prices are zero. This 
occurs only when the difference in demand is so large that even when transport is offered for 
free the overcapacity in supplyis not utilised. 
 
Under the competitive model, once carriers are unloaded in the low demand region, they have 
only two options: either to return with backhaul or to sail back empty to the high demand 
region. In equilibrium, when we assume that transport flows are positive in both directions, we 
face one of the two following equilibria. In Equilibrium 1, the value of returning with 
backhaul exceeds the value of sailing back empty and all carriers decide to wait for backhaul. 
Fronthaul prices will be higher than the backhaul price due to the difference in demand. In 
Equilibrium 2, carriers are indifferent between returning with backhaul or sailing back empty. 
Backhaul prices will then drop to zero, and the quantity transported from the high demand 
region, let us say region X, exceeds the quantity from the high demand region, let us say 
region Y. A summary of these two equilibria is given in Table 1, where Q and p represent 
quantity transported and the price of transport; and subscripts X and Y indicate the fronthaul 
(high demand) and backhaul (low demand) market respectively. In this setting there is no third 
equilibrium where QX > QY and at the same time pX ≥ `pY > 0. As emphasized above, this 
implies that in situations where some of  the carriers return empty, the backhaul price is equal 
to zero. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 For convenience transport demanding customers are called customers in the remainder of the text. 
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Table 1: Summary of the two Equilibria for the competitive model. 
 Quantities Transported Prices 
Equilibrium 1 QX = QY `pX ≥ `pY > 0 
Equilibrium 2 QX > QY `pY = 0 
 
It is not difficult to give examples that describe the backhaul problem which depart from the 
predictions of the competitive model using transport freight prices that are publicly available. 
For example from www.freight-calculator.com (2007) we can find the realistic freight prices 
for 1 TEU container of building material, with a weight of 10,000 pounds and a value of $ 
50,000, from Shanghai to San Francisco and back . It appears that from Shanghai to San 
Francisco, the freight price is $ 2,776 and from San Francisco to Shanghai it is $ 1,349. 
  
As is well known, the imbalance between merchandise goods flows between China and the 
U.S. is large. In value terms, the flow from China is worth 4 times that of the return flow  
(WTO, 2005). When we assume that profit margins are similar per dollar of merchandise good 
this may give a proper indication of the imbalance in demand for transport (expressed in 
volume) between both countries. Nevertheless the freight price for the return trip from the 
U.S. to China is considerable. 
 
As another example we have the study by Jonkeren et al. (2007), which analyses information 
on prices for inland navigation transport on the Western-European Rhine river between the 
Netherlands and Germany. Backhaul prices (from Germany to the Netherlands) are 76% of the 
fronthaul prices (from the Netherlands to Germany), whereas aggregated demand for front-
haul is approximately 1,5 times demand for backhaul (Statistics Netherlands, 2007). Plausibly, 
the imbalance at a micro level is substantially higher due to restrictions on the type of freight 
and variation in demand over time. Nevertheless, backhaul prices are far from close to zero 
under the presented demand imbalances. 
 
The competitive model assumes that customers and supplying carriers possess complete 
information about each other’s (future) presence and location in the market. This implies the 
absence of market friction and therefore no waiting times (due to search) for carriers or 
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customers. In our matching model, we show that the carrier’s (expected) waiting time (due to 
search) are a possible cause for positive backhaul prices, independent of the degree of 
imbalance.3 Costs due to waiting times cannot be embedded exogenously into a competitive 
framework, because these costs depend on the imbalance in demand. The strength of the 
matching model is that it is able model waiting times endogenously, which gives possibility to 
study its underlaying causes.  
 
Matching models are used for markets where suppliers and customers are in a search for each 
other and face a certain difficulty to form a match. This kind of models are now standard in 
the labour market literature (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000), but are also used in transport 
economics. For an example of a matching model to study the taxi market, see Lagos (1996). It 
is well applicable in a freight transport market, as carriers and the customers are searching for 
each other and have difficulty to find each other. This difficulty is not only due to spatial 
distance, demand for special vehicle types and preference of carriers for certain trips, but also 
due to a lack of information about the appearance of counter-parties in general.  
 
In the current paper, we analyse the backhaul problem within a two-way transport context. For 
expositional reasons, we start in Section 2 with a model that describes only one-way freight 
transport. We also give a numerical presentation for this model. In Section 3, we formulate the 
two-way transport model to study the backhaul problem. In Section 4 we analyse the backhaul 
problem numerically, with input values chosen from the inland navigation market on the 
Rhine river in Western-Europe. One application is performed by studying the effect of 
increased transportation costs, e.g. due to expected climate changes. Section 5 ends with a few 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Other reasons for positive backhaul prices may be found in increased fuel costs when deciding to return loaded 
and waiting time due to loading and unloading. These costs could be added exogenously to both the competitive 
and the matching model. However we argue that these are not the only causes of positive backhaul prices. 
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X Y 
Empty 
Full 
Figure 1:   One-way transport network 
2. The matching model with one-way transport 
2.1 Introduction 
 
We start with a one-way transport model between the locations X and Y. We presume a fixed 
number of customers located in X that have a demand for transport of a single good from X to 
Y, as is presented graphically in Figure 1. Goods are transported by means of barges.4 One 
barge may at most ship one good, so the barge is either full or empty. Customers and barge 
owners are risk neutral. For now we presume that barges return from Y empty, as we assume 
no demand in Y. Hence when arriving in X all barges are empty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We presume that it takes time to travel from one location to the other. The travel duration is 
taken exogenous and is the same in both directions.5 We assume that in X a barge will have to 
search for a customer, and due to imperfect information about customers that may have a 
demand for transport, this will take time. Similarly for a customer it will also take time to find 
a barge. It is assumed that customers in X and barges may contact each other only when barges 
wait in X (but not when barges are sailing).6 Customers and barges contact each other 
                                                 
4
 This is one specific form of carrier, but the results are of course general. 
5
 The assumption that travel duration in both direction is made for convenience. 
6
 We restrict the search technology to avoid complexities in linking the contacting and subsequently matching to 
the theoretical backhaul framework, see e.g. Pissarides (1994). Even though the assumption of  “no-search-while-
sailing” might be restrictive for most transport markets, it may serve as a starting point for more realistic 
matching models in the backhaul context. 
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according to a contact function. The contact function specifies the number of contacts taking 
place in X during a time period as a function of the number of waiting barges and customers in 
X. Given a contact, the customer and the barge bargain about the freight price. If they agree on 
a price, which we later on show to occur with probability one, the customer and barge are 
matched. Hence, the matching function is identical to the contacting function. When a barge 
and a customer are matched, the barge is loaded and sails towards location Y, from where it 
returns without freight.  
 
It is natural to assume free entry of barges at X in the long run. This assumption is natural, 
because bargemen require little capital to start. In addition, the number of customers is 
exogenously given and equal to N. We assume that a customer withdraws from the market 
after it has been matched to a barge and is immediately replaced by a new customer, so the 
number of customers remains constant. This is an easy way of modelling freight demand 
without having to worry about the exact production process of the goods transported. One 
could think of the customer as a trading company with a given cost for its merchandise. These 
costs are sunk, so these costs play no role anymore in the transport market. The customer 
however incurs costs of storage and search will be modelled explicitly later on. We denote the 
number of barges waiting at location X as BW. At every moment in time there are BT barges on 
their way transporting (from X to Y or Y to X). The total number of barges is equal to B (= BT 
+ BW ). The duration of a round trip is equal to 1/λ. In the extreme case that barges would sail 
continuously between X and Y (so they do not have to search for firms), λ can be interpreted as 
the number of round trips a certain barge makes during one period of time (e.g. one year). The 
parameter λ can then be interpreted as the rate at which a barge arrives in X. It appears that the 
mathematics becomes much easier when this assumptions is rephrased. For mathematical 
convenience, we will assume that the duration of a round trip is exponentially distributed, with 
a mean equal to 1 / λ instead of assuming a given round trip duration. As we have assumed 
that customers and barge owners are risk neutral, all decisions made by barge owners will not 
depend on other properties of this exponential distribution than its mean. 
 
Customers incur a cost κ per period, e.g. due to search and storage cost. Given a contact with a 
barge, a customer receives price J for the good (and as stated above withdraws from the 
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transport market). We define u = BW /B as the ratio of barges that wait in X to the total number 
of barges and we define v = N/B as the ratio of the number of customers to the number of 
barges.7 Therefore 0 < u < 1 and 0 < v < ∞. We introduce the variable θ = v/u, which can be 
interpreted as a measure of market tightness. It can be easily seen that θ equals N / BW, the 
number of customers divided by the number of waiting barge. 
  
The contact function, denoted as m, defines the number of contacts between waiting barges BW 
and the number of customers, N, per period. This function can therefore be written as 
m(BW ,N), and is assumed to be increasing in both arguments. The function is assumed to 
exhibit non-decreasing returns to scale in its arguments, such that  
m(α BW ,α N)  ≥ α m(BW ,N), where α is a given constant larger than or equal to one. This 
assumption means that contacting may become easier when markets are more dense, for 
example because it becomes easier for customers to find a barge that better suits its needs.8 
 
We define q as the rate9 at which a customer contacts a barge waiting in X. Due to the non-
decreasing returns to scale assumption, it follows that: 
 






=





=== 1,1 1, ),(
θ
αα m
v
u
m
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vBuBm
N
mq   with α  ≥ 1. 
 
Given θ and q, the rate at which an waiting barge contacts a customer is determined and given 
by θq. We emphasize that q and θq are endogenously determined. 
  
2.2 The Steady State Condition and Bellman Equations 
 
                                                 
7
 Note that ‘u’ stands for unemployed, and ‘v’ stands for the relative of customers with a vacancy.  
8
 Note that we allow for the situation that m(α BW ,α N) = α m(BW ,N), so we allow for constant returns to scale. 
For the large literature on constant and increasing return to scale in for example the labour market, see 
Warren (1996) 
9
 A rate is defined as the average number of times an event happens to a single actor during a prespecified time. 
For example “rate σ is equal to n” could stand for “a certain event happens on average n times per year to a single 
actor”. 
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We will analyse the economy in steady state, which means that the stock of total barges and 
waiting barges does not change over time. In this situation, the outflow of barges that depart 
from X in one period equals the inflow of barges into X in that period. So we get:  
 
θ q u = λ (1 – u ). 
 
Solving for u, the ratio of waiting barges, we get    
 
    
q
u
θλ
λ
+
= .    (1) 
 
Hence, the ratio of waiting barges (to the total number of barges) depends merely on λ, which 
is the inverse of the average round trip duration of barges and θq, which is the inverse of the 
average waiting time of barges. Only when the average waiting time approaches zero, then the 
number of waiting barges can be ignored. This is the situation assumed in the competitive 
model. 
  
Barges can be in two possible states: waiting and sailing. For further modelling purposes, a 
monetary asset value is assigned for having the oppportunity to be in one of these two states. 
We define W as the asset value of waiting in X, and S as the asset value of sailing.10 It is 
convenient to define S at the moment of departing from location X. We define tc as the cost of 
transport during one period of time. The cost of transport is assumed to be independent of 
whether a barge is loaded or unloaded. We define wc as the cost for barges to wait for freight 
in X during one period of time, and define p as the (endogenous) freight price paid by the 
customer to the bargeman to transport a good to the opposite side.11 The discount rate is 
denoted as r. 
 
                                                 
10
 Note that the value of sailing depends on where the barge is between X and Y. In the current model, we allow 
for this complication, but we need only the asset value in X. 
11
 Note that S < 0 as is not more than an obligation to sail regardless of the price received. The price freight p 
must exceed S for a transport market to exist. 
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In our setting Bellman equations define the return on an asset during a prespecified time 
period (see Bellman (1952)). The following Bellman equation defines the value of W: 
 
r W = – wc + θ q ( S – W + p ).   (2) 
 
The interpretation of (2) is straightforward (see Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)). The left-
hand-side is the per period return rW on the asset of waiting W. The right-hand-side being the 
per period cost of waiting, –wc, plus the expected gain of finding a customer, which is equal to 
θ q ( S – W + p ). The expected gain of making contact with a customer, θ q ( S – W + p ), is 
equal to the product of θ q, the rate at which a barge finds a customer, and ( S – W + p ), 
which is the surplus a bargeman gains from a match with the firm. The surplus of the match is 
equal to the asset of sailing S, minus the asset of waiting W plus the price p of transport to 
location Y. 
 
Similarly, the Bellman equation (3) defines the asset value of S: 
 
r S = – tc + λ ( W – S )    (3) 
 
The left-hand-side of equation (3) is the per period return on the asset of sailing S. The right-
hand-side is equal to the per period cost of transporting, -tc, plus the expected benefit of 
returning to X, where the bargeman will search for another contact with a customer. This 
expected benefit, λ ( W – S ), is equal to the rate of returning to X, λ, multiplied by the surplus 
of returning to X, which consists of the difference between the value of waiting in X, and the 
value of sailing from X. 
 
When a customer searches for a barge to transport its good is defined to have an asset value V, 
which can also be interpreted as the value of being in this transport market. When matching 
occurs, the customer receives immediately price J for the good, and pays the price p for 
transport.12 There is a per period cost of search κ to find a barge.13  
                                                 
12
 Note that one may also assume that the customer receives J the moment that the good arrives at the other side. 
As travel durations are exogenous, this gives the same results. 
13
 This may be interpreted as the combined cost of search and storage. 
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For customers, the following Bellman equation defines V: 
 
r V = – κ + q ( J – V – p ).    (4) 
 
The return on searching for a customer is equal to the search cost, –κ, plus the expected gain 
of finding a barge q ( J – V – p ). This expected gain is the rate q multiplied by the surplus J – 
V – p. This surplus is equal to the revenue J for selling the product, minus the price p paid for 
transport, and minus the loss of asset V, as the customer leaves the market.   
 
2.3 The Free-Entry Condition 
 
The number of barges in the market B is endogenous. We assume that barges can enter and 
leave the market in X at no cost. This means that entry and exit of barges at location X will 
occur until W = 0. Given equations (2) and (3) and W = 0, we obtain the following free-entry 
condition: 
   
r
tc
q
wcp
+
+= λθ
.     (5) 
 
Note that wc/θq can be interpreted as expected waiting costs and )/( rtc +λ as the transport 
cost of a return trip. Hence, given free entry, the resulting freight price is a compensation for a 
bargeman’s expected waiting costs plus the transport cost. According to (5), the freight price 
has a lower bound, that is: )/( rtcp +≥ λ . When θq approaches infinity, so the expected 
waiting time 1 / θq approaches zero, then )/( rtcp += λ . When )/( rtcp += λ , so prices are 
equal the marginal cost of transportation, and waiting times are zero, the results according to 
the current model are actually not different from the results according to the competitive 
model. 
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2.4 Price Determination 
 
Given a contact, the bargeman and the customer are assumed to negotiate a freight price p 
according to a Nash-bargaining rule (see Binmore et al. (1986))14. It is assumed that : 
 
p = arg max (S - W + p)β(J – V – p)1-β,  (6) 
 
where β measures the bargaining power of the bargeman, and 1 – β measures the bargaining 
power of the customer (0 < β < 1). Using  equations (2), (3), (4) and W = 0, one can solve for 
p (see Appendix A). This gives: 
 
 
 (7) 
 
where 
21
1
1 ZZ
Z
w
+
=
  and  
21
2
2 ZZ
Z
w
+
=
 
 
and where 
qr
rZ
+
=
β
1   and  β−=12Z  
 
Hence, p can be written, rather conveniently as a weighted average of J+κ/r and tc/(r+λ). 
From (5) we that J+κ/r must be higher than tc/(r+λ) for the market to exist. From (7) one can 
see that the freight price p can be interpreted as the weighted average of the two prices 
prevalent in two extreme situations. The first extreme situation occurs when β = 0 (the 
customer has all market power, so Z1 = 0 and Z2 = 1) and the second occurs when β = 1 (the 
bargeman has all market power, so Z1 = 1 and Z2 = 0). When the customer has all the market 
power, the freight price is equal to tc/(r+λ), which measures the transport cost. In this 
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 This contacting/matching followed by has become standard in the labour market and housing market literature, 
see e.g. Wheaton (1990). 
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(extreme) case, there are no waiting times for the barges. This makes sense, and is the result 
obtained in the competitive model. Loosely speaking, barges only enter this (inattractive) 
market if they never have to search. In the other extreme situation when the bargeman has all 
the market power (β = 1), the freight price equals J +  κ / r.15 This also makes sense. The 
customer is never willing to pay a freight price that exceeds the maximum search costs (κ / r) 
plus the price that the customer for the good (J). 
 
It is important to observe the following. The resulting freight price p is higher than the freight 
price from the competitive model, which would have been tc / ( r + λ ). From (5) we have that 
the freight price p is equal to the cost of waiting plus the cost of sailing. it must be noted that 
the strength of this model is the endogeneity of the waiting time and therefore the waiting cost. 
We know from (7) that p is a weighted average of two factors, of which one (being J + κ / r) 
depends on J, the value of the transported good. This means that the waiting time implicitly 
depends on J. 
 
We now have a system with 6 endogenous variables, being p, u, v, θ, q, BW and 6 equations. 
These are the matching function, equation (1), (5), (7) and the definition of θ and BW. This 
gives us an equilibrium outcome and opens the way for numerical analysis. Finding pure 
analytical solutions will not be possible for most matching functions. 
 
2.5 Numerical Analysis of the one-way matching model 
 
In the introduction, we have emphasized that market friction may be relevant to understand 
backhaul prices. In this section, we analyse the effect of (exogenously imposed) differences in 
market friction on freight prices. In order to obtain numerical results for the one-way model,  
we need to assume a functional form of the matching function m. We use a Cobb-Douglas 
function δγφ yxyxm =),(  which has the property of nondecreasing returns to scale, ( γ  + δ  ≥ 
                                                 
15
 This is equal to an infinite payment of the search costs for the customer plus the value that the customer 
receives for selling the good. This means that when the customer has no market power at all, he is willing to pay 
his infinite-period search costs, and the received benefit J on top of it, which is not different than never having it 
transported and sold. A higher price than this is not sustainable. 
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1 ), and where φ  is a scale parameter. Numerical values for the exogenous parameters wc, tc, 
λ, κ, r and J have been chosen from the case of a bargeman sailing between The Netherlands 
and Germany on the Rhine river. The time period is taken as one year. The values of φ , γ  and 
δ are obtained by calibrating the model on the waiting times of customers and barges both in X 
and Y. The Cobb-Douglas parameters γ  and δ are set to γ  = 0.6 and δ = 0.6. This is done in 
the first place because it gives a well calibrated model. Secondly it has the interpretation of a 
‘slightly’ increasing returns to scale as a doubling of the number of searching actors means a 
multiplication of the number of matches by 2.30 (=20.6 * 20.6). 
 
For the one-way model we analyze two different cases. The first case is a base case, where we 
encounter ‘normal’ market friction. Recall that δγφ yxyxm =),( , φ  being an inverse 
indicator the level of market friction, where φ  is set equal to 30. In the second case we set 
market friction at a higher level by choosing the lower value of 15 for φ , (which has a 
negative effect on the number of matches). In Table 4, the chosen values for the exogenous 
parameters are given for both cases.  
 
Table 4: Input parameters 
Parameter Value Description 
`wc €150,000 (Cost per year of waiting in the harbor. Taken to be 3/5 of tc)16 
`tc €250,000 (Cost per year of sailing. λ trips, with a per trip cost of  €  5,000) 
`λ 50 (Number of trips per year which a barge can technically make when it is loaded all the 
time. We assume a trip duration of ca. 1 week) 
`κ €25,000 (Costs per year of search and storage if a customer would search continuously for a 
whole year) 
`r 0.05 (Annual interest rate) 
`N 400 (Number of customers located in X, taken 100 for simplicity) 
`J €100,000 (Received price by a customer for the good that is transported) 
`β 0.5 (Equal bargaining power) 
`γ 0.6 (Parameter of Cobb-Douglas matching function, related to increasing returns to scale) 
`δ 0.6 (Parameter of Cobb-Douglas matching function, related to increasing returns to scale) 
 
                                                 
16
 wc is so high, because in practice the only difference between wc and tc are fuel costs. 
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The resulting values for the endogenous variables for the two cases can be found in the Table 
5. 
 
Table 5: Values for the endogenous variables in the one-way model 
Variable Case 1 Case 2 
`
φ (exogenous)
 
30 15 
`p € 5,783.97 € 6,571.25 
`θ 5.0554 5.0688 
`q 37.6081 18.7741 
`u 0.2082 0.3444 
`v 1.0527 1.7459 
`B 379.9881 229.1063 
`BW 79.1236 78.9137 
Waiting time for barges 1.9211 days 3.8382 days 
Waiting time for customers 9.7120 days 19.4550 days 
Number of matches per year 15,043.22 7,509.63 
 
The achieved results are as might have been conjectured. In Case 1 it can be seen that the 
agreed freight price is € 5,784 , which is almost eight hundred euros higher than the marginal 
cost of transport tc/(r+λ) = € 4,995. As mentioned earlier this is due to the waiting cost for 
which bargemen need to be compensated. In Case 2 we increased market friction (decreasing 
φ ). This resulted in less matches per year, longer waiting times and a higher freight price of € 
6,571. It can be concluded that, within our framework, freight prices are quite sensitive to 
market friction. 
 
Summarizing, in this section, we have outlined a matching model in a one-way transport 
framework, and shown that within this framework, market friction positively affects freight 
prices. In the following two sections we will study a matching model in a two-way transport 
framework. This two-way model is then employed to analyse backhaul pricing. 
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3. Two-way transport 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Our model will now be extended by introducing two-way transport in order to study backhaul 
prices. Customers with a demand for transport are now located in both locations X and Y. As 
above, customers aim to have their goods transported by barges to the opposite side.17 We 
allow for a difference in demand between location X and location Y. Hence, the number of 
customers in one location exceeds the number of customers in the other location. We choose 
(arbitrarily) location X to be the high demand location and Y to be the low demand location. 
For convenience, other exogenous parameters are assumed to be identical for both locations 
and directions. We define the numbers of customers located at each side by NX and NY, 
respectively, so NX ≥ NY. We denote BWX and BWY as the number of waiting bargemen at X and 
Y, respectively. These are the bargemen who search for customers with a good to be shipped. 
 
As above, the duration of a trip from one location to the other is taken to be distributed with a 
given mean. To keep analogy with the one-way case, we define the sailing time from one 
location to the other as 1 / (2λ). This means that the rate to sail from X to Y is equal to 2λ. At 
every moment in time, there are BT barges on their way transporting. In the steady state, the 
number of ships sailing in both directions must be equal (as the mean trip durations are the 
same in both directions). So, as in the one-way transport problem, BT / 2 barges sail in every 
direction (otherwise the steady state condition would be violated). The total number of barges 
in the market B is now equal to BT + BWX + BWY. We again assume free entry of barges (so B is 
endogenously determined). Barges may only exit at the location they enter, so a barge has to 
make at least one round trip. 
 
3.2 Bellman Equations and Free-Entry Condition 
 
                                                 
17
 In the equilibria that we consider transport flows will be positive in both directions. 
   16 
We use subscript X and Y to denote location and direction specific variables. Analogously to 
the one-way case we introduce uX (=BWX / B), uY (=BWY / B), vX (= NX / B), vY (= NY / B), 
θX (= vX/uX) and θY (= vY/uY). Given the matching function, which is assumed to be of 
nondecreasing returns to scale, the contacting rates qX and qY for customers and θXqX and θYqY 
for barges are defined. For the customers at X and Y the corresponding asset values, for being 
in the market and being searching for barges, are VX and VY respectively. The following 
Bellman equations define VX and VY: 
 
r VX = – κ + qX ( J – VX – pX )    
r VY = – κ + qY ( J – VY – pY )    
 
Solving for VX and VY gives: 
X
XX
X qr
pJqV
+
−−
=
κ)(
   (8) 
Y
YY
Y qr
pJqV
+
−−
=
κ)(
    (9) 
 
In the current set-up, bargemen may choose at each location between two options: waiting for 
freight or sailing without freight to the other location.18 For a bargeman, we denote the value 
of waiting at X as WX and the value of starting to sail from X as SX. WY and SY are defined 
similarly. This gives the following Bellman equations for a bargeman in X: 
 
r WX = – wc + θX qX ( SX – WX + pX )   (10) 
r SX = – tc + 2λ ( max ( WY, SY ) – SX )  (11) 
 
Equation (10) defines the return on the asset of waiting for freight, rWX. It consists of the cost 
of waiting (-wc) plus the matching rate (θXqX) multiplied by the surplus of a match ( SX – WX + 
                                                 
18 In equilibrium, it can never be optimal for a bargeman to wait and decide after a while to leave without 
freight. As market circumstances do not change in our model, leaving can best be done immediately after 
arriving.  
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pX ). This surplus is the summation of a gain of the asset of sailing (SX), a loss of the asset of 
waiting (–WX) and a revenue of the freight price (pX).  
 
Equation (11) defines the return on the asset of sailing, rSX. It consists of a cost of sailing (-tc), 
plus the arrival rate (2λ) multiplied by the value of arriving at Y (max ( WY, SY ) – SX ).  This 
value is the maximum value of two types of strategies (waiting or sailing) once arrived in Y 
(which is max ( WY, SY )) and the obligation of sailing (– SX) as the bargeman leaves location 
X. 
 
For a bargeman in Y, we have a similar formulation: 
 
r WY = – wc + θY qY ( SY – WY + pY )   (12) 
r SY = – tc + 2λ ( max ( WX, SX ) – SY )  (13) 
 
We will now distinguish between different types of equilibria. It can be easily seen from 
equations (10) to (13) that the type of equilibrium in the market is determined by the value of 
WX relative to SX and by the value of WY relative to SY. In Appendix B, all nine equilibria are 
discussed and it is demonstrated that there are only two economically-meaningful equilibria: 
 
In Equilibrium 1:  WX > SX and WY > SY ; 
In Equilibrium 2: WX > SX and WY = SY . 
 
Note that in both equilibria, WX exceeds SX, so all barges in X will decide to wait for freight 
and will never sail empty to Y. In Equilibrium 1, barges in Y also decide to wait and therefore 
never sail empty. In Equilibrium 2 barges are, once arrived at Y, indifferent between waiting 
for freight or sailing back empty to X. Therefore a strictly positive fraction, denoted as 1 – µY 
of barges, will sail back empty from Y to X. The variable µY represents the fraction of barges 
that arrive in Y and wait in Y for freight.19 In Equilibrium 1, µY = 1 and WY > SY . In 
Equilibrium 2, 0 < µY < 1 and WY = SY . Hence the following condition holds:  
 
                                                 
19
 Of course, µX = 1, so this variable will not be introduced. 
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( µY – 1 ) (WY – SY ) = 0.  (14) 
 
We emphasize that it is Equilibrium 2 which is of main empirical interest, as for this situation 
barges can be said to have a ‘backhaul problem’. 
 
In the extreme case that NX = NY , it appers that only Equilibrium 1 may occur.20 When 
NX > NY, we can have either Equilibrium 1 or Equilibrium 2. One can show that when NX is 
“close” to NY, we have Equilibrium 1, and when NX is clearly greater than NY, we will have 
Equilibrium 2.21,22 
 
3.3 Steady State 
 
In this and the next subsection we formulate a few additional equations in order to solve the 
model. In steady state, the outflow of barges at a location equals the inflow of barges into that 
location in one period. Hence, at X, it must hold that: 
 
θX  qX  uX = λ (1 – uX – uY ) 
 
Similarly, in location Y we now have  
 
θY  qY  uY = µY λ (1 – uX – uY ) 
 
Solving for uX and uY gives us: 
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 This is easy to see, as due to symmetry, behaviour in X must be the same as in Y. 
21
 So, when keeping NY constant, a threshold value NX* exists such that when NX > NX* we end up in 
Equilibrium 2. However no analytical expression can be found for NX*. For example with the parameters in Table 
4 we find that with NY = 100, NX* ≈ 100.47 already separates Equilibrium 1 and 2. 
22
 Note that WX > SX and WY ≥ SY implies that max(WX, SX) = WX and max(WY, SY) = WY. Furthermore, we assume 
the free-entry condition of barges, which implies that either WX = 0 or WY = 0. (It can be shown that both cannot 
be zero when NX ≠ NY). As it is more attractive to wait where the demand is higher we suppose that WX = 0 (and 
consequently WY < 0). This implies that entry by barges occurs only at the location where most customers are 
present, which is X as we assume NX > NY  for reasons of symmetry.  
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3.4 Price Determination 
 
We now derive the price equations in the same way as done for the one-way model. Hence, 
given a contact between a barge and a customer, the two parties are assumed to negotiate on 
the freight price according to a Nash-bargaining rule. Analogously to the one-way model, the 
price in location i, where i = X or Y, is determined by: 
 
pi = arg max (Si – Wi + pi)β (J – Vi – pi)(1-β) . 
 
The first-order condition with respect to pi is then  β (J – Vi – pi) = (1 - β) (Si – Wi + pi), so 
 
 
pi = β (J – Vi) – (1 – β) (Si – Wi)  (17) 
 
where in the case of  i = X the free entry condition WX = 0 holds. We are now provided with 
two more price equations.  
 
3.5 Backhaul Prices 
 
We will assume now that r / λ approaches zero. Note that r and λ are both strictly positive, so 
this implies that λ is much larger than r. This condition is always met in practice as r / λ is very 
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small. When r is taken close to 0.05 and λ close to 50, r / λ is equal to 0.001. We are now able 
to formulate a theorem, of which the proof is given in Appendix C. 
 
Theorem 1. 
In a matching model for a two-way market, the backhaul price pY will be strictly positive, 
when r / λ approaches zero. 
 
Thus, we have been able to find a solid theoretical basis for the phenomenon that in 
unbalanced markets the price at the low demand market is clearly higher than zero. 
 
Similar to the competitive model, we may now construct Table 7, which summarizes the main 
result of our matching model. It presents the demand for transport and the freight prices under 
the two equilibriums for the matching model. The quantities transported follow from the 
definition of the two equilibria. The prices follow from the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix C. 
 
Table 7: Summary of the two Equilibria for the two-way matching model. 
 Quantities Transported Prices 
Equilibrium 1 QX = QY `pX ≥ `pY > 0 
Equilibrium 2 QX > QY `pY > 0 
 
For Equilibrium 2 it is also shown in Appendix C that, when r / λ approaches zero, the 
following price equations hold: 
 
λθ
tc
q
wcp
XX
X +=  
YY
Y q
wcp
θ
= .` 
 
In Equilibrium 2, we see that barges in X are be compensated for their waiting time and for the 
round-trip transport cost to Y and back. In Y, barges are compensated only for their waiting 
time in Y. This shows similarity with the result from the competitive backhaul literature, see 
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Boyer (1998), except for the compensation of waiting costs. These depend on the 
endogenously determined waiting times. We have now presented a solid theoretical basis, 
where waiting times due to market friction is a main reason why backhaul prices are positive, 
even under very imbalanced transport markets.   
 
4. Numerical Analysis for the two-way model 
 
In order to solve the model, and to do numerical analysis, we assume a functional form for the 
matching function m. For the same reasons as for the one-way model we use a Cobb-Douglas 
function δγφ yxyxm =),(  which has the property of nondecreasing returns to scale, 
( γ  + δ  ≥ 1 ), and where φ  is a scale parameter. 
 
Analogously to the one-way situation we have for  i = X, Y: 
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Then  
111 ),1( −+−−+ == δγγδγ θφθθ iiiiii NmNq , 
and  
111 )1,( −+−−−+ == δγγδγ θφθ iiiii NmNq . 
 
Now we have sufficient information to solve the model for the freight prices pX and pY. The 
model has now a system with 15 (base) endogenous variables, being pX, pY, uX, uY, qX, qY, θX, 
θY, µY, VX, VY, SX, SY, WX and WY. The 15 equations to solve for these endogenous variables are 
equation (8) to (16), equation (17) (two times), the definition of the matching function (two 
times), the free entry entry condition and the identintity NX / (uX θX) = NY / (uY θY) which 
follows from the definitions of uX, uY, vX, vY, θX, and θY,. The remaining endogenous variables 
follow from their definitions. 
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It must be noted that the freight prices depend on the expected waiting cost of barges. In our 
model these expected waiting cost depend, among others, on the degree of friction in the 
market, represented by φ , on the value of the good J, the imbalance in demand between the 
two locations, represented by the number of customers NX and NY and on the rate at which 
loaded ships sail from one location to the other, represented by λ. For numerical analysis we 
explore consequences of varying the parameters λ, φ , NX, and J, (we keep NY constant). 
 
The numerical analysis starts by choosing a reference case where the parameters are identical 
to the one-way model (Table 4). The only difference is that we have less customers in X, so 
NY  = 100, whereas as before NX = 400. The values of the endogenous variables for the 
reference case are given in Table 6 with the description given for every variable. 
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Table 6: Endogenous variables for the reference case of the two-way model 
Variable 
Resulting 
Value 
Description 
`pX € 5,785.21 Freight price from X to Y 
`pY € 1,043.66 Freight price from Y to X 
`WX € 0 Asset value of waiting for a barge in X 
`SX - € 4,996.25 Asset value of sailing for a barge in X 
`WY - € 2.498.75 Asset value of waiting for a barge in Y 
`SY - € 2.498.75 Asset value of sailing for a barge in Y 
`VX € 93,425.82 Asset value of waiting for a customer in X 
`VY € 97,912.68 Asset value of waiting for a customer in Y 
`qX 37.6080 Rate of finding a barge for a customer in X 
`qY 28.6450 Rate of finding a barge for a customer in Y 
`θX 5.0554 Market tightness from the viewpoint of a barge in X  
`θY 5.0133 Market tightness from the viewpoint of a barge in Y 
`uX 0.1978 Fraction of total barges that wait in X 
`uY 0.0499 Fraction of total barges that wait in Y 
`vX 1.0002 Ratio of customers in X to total barges 
`vY 0.2500 Ratio of customers in Y to total barges
 
`µY 0.1904 Fraction of arriving barges that decide to wait in Y 
`B 399.9346 Total number of barges present in the market 
`BWX 79.1234 Number of barges that wait in X 
`BWY 19.9470 Number of barges that wait in Y 
`BT 300.8641 Number of barges that are on their way transporting 
Waiting time for barges in X 1.9211 days Calculated as 365.25 days / θXqX 
Waiting time for barges in Y 2.5434 days Calculated as 365.25 days / θYqY 
Waiting time for customers in X 9.7120 days Calculated as 365.25 days / qX 
Waiting time for customers in Y 12.7509 days Calculated as 365.25 days / qY 
`Number of matches per year in X  (QX) 15,043.20 Calculated as φ BWXγ NXδ 
`Number of matches per year in Y  (QY) 2864.50 Calculated as φ BWYγ NYδ 
`One-way traveling time 3.6525 days Calculated as 365.25 days / (2λ) 
`One-way traveling cost € 2,498.75 Calculated as tc/(r+λ) 
`(Expected) waiting cost in X for a barge € 788.96 Calculated as wc/ θXqX 
`(Expected) waiting cost in Y for a barge
 
€ 1,044.53 Calculated as wc/ θYqY 
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From Table 6, as WY = SY, it can be seen that Equilibrium 2 arises.23 In agreement with 
Theorem 1 we see that the backhaul price pY is positive, (pY is 18 % of pX), even though some 
bargemen return empty to X. In addition, due to the increasing returns to scale property of the 
matching function, waiting times in Y are longer than in X. This difference in waiting times 
implies a  difference in waiting cost of €256 (= €1,045 - €789), which is a reason why  the 
difference between pX and pY is smaller than a situation with equal waiting times. Furthermore 
we see that 19 % of the barges that arrive in Y decide to wait there for freight. 
 
Numerical analysis is now done by varying parameters and comparing the outcomes with the 
outcomes of the reference case. We distinguish four cases which correspond to the changing 
of λ, φ , NX, and J respectively. We report on the four groups, enumerated 1 to 4, by giving a 
brief description, the table of relevant outputs and the comment on the outcomes. 
 
4.1. Delays in transport caused by climate change 
 
Due to climate change it is expected that the Rhine river will be blocked more often due to 
high water levels in winter. In our model this can be taken into account by a lower rate of 
round trips (λ). Also in summer there can be transported less per trip due to expected lower 
water levels. If we measure trips in fully loaded barges, we expect that fewer trips will occur. 
Also this fact can be modeled by a lower λ. We choose the lower values for λ to be 45 and 40 
respectively, compared with the reference value of 50. The resulting output for endogenous 
variables can be found in Table 8. 
 
                                                 
23
 In our chosen parameter set we see that Equilibrium 1 only arises for a small range of NX. 
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Table 8: Effects of variations in the round trip rate λ  
Variable Reference Case Case 1 Case 2 
`λ     (exogenous) 50 45 40 
`pX € 5,785.21 € 6,339.60 € 7,032.44 
`pY € 1,043.66 € 1,043.60 € 1,043.53 
`µY 0.1904 0.1905 0.1907 
`B 399.9346 433.1046 474.5143 
Waiting time for barges in X 1.9211 days 1.9204 days 1.9195 days 
Waiting time for barges in Y 2.5434 days 2.5435 days 2.5436 days 
Waiting time for customers in X 9.7120 days 9.7175 days 9.7243 days 
Waiting time for customers in Y 12.7509 days 12.7502 days 12.7493 days 
`Number of matches per year in X 15,043.20 15,034.78 15,024.24 
`Number of matches per year in Y 2,864.50 2,864.66 2,864.85 
`One-way traveling time 3.6525 days 4.0583 days 4.5656 days 
`One-way traveling cost € 2,498.75 € 2,776.24 € 3,123.05 
`(Expected) waiting cost in X for a barge € 788.96 € 788.67 € 788.29 
`(Expected) waiting cost in Y for a barge
 
€ 1,044.53 € 1,044.57 € 1,044.62 
 
 
The result of less possible trips per year due to climate change or other reasons, which is 
represented by a lower value for λ, implies a longer expected traveling time per trip and a 
higher one-way transport cost. As we are in Equilibrium 2 for both Case 1 and 2 and the 
waiting times are almost unchanged, this higher transport cost is borne entirely by customers 
in X, which pay higher freight prices. A related result of the expected climate change is that 
customers in the high demand location X see that their asset VX of being in the market 
decreases, while no such thing happens for customers in the low demand location. 
 
Another interesting thing to note is that more barges (B) enter the market when decreasing λ. 
This makes sense as conditions at the demand side are unchanged, and less supply per barge is 
possible, more barges become necessary. Nevertheless we see a slight decrease in the actual 
number of matches in X. 
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4.2. Different degrees of market friction 
 
In this set of numerical cases, we study different degrees of market friction. In Case 3 we 
study the case of an increased market friction by lowering φ  to 15 (which means less matches 
given the same input for the matching function). In Case 4 we set φ  to the very high value of 
1000. We do this to illustrate the case of negligible friction to get close to the competitive 
model. Table 9 summarizes the result. 
 
Table 9: Effects of variations in the market friction related parameter φ   
Variable Case 3 Reference Case Case 4 
`
φ  (exogenous)
 
15 30 1000 
`pX € 6,572.50 € 5,785.21 € 5,019.95 
`pY € 2,084.41 € 1,043.66 € 31,35 
`µY 0.1903 0.1904 0.1905 
`B 248.9835 399.9346 10,143.66 
Waiting time for barges in X 3.8381 days 1.9211 days 0.0577 days 
Waiting time for barges in Y 5.0798 days 2.5434 days 0.0764 days 
Waiting time for customers in X 19.4550 days 9.7120 days 0.2909 days 
Waiting time for customers in Y 25.5553 days 12.7509 days 0.3818 days 
`Number of matches per year in X 7,509.62 15,043.20 502,215.72 
`Number of matches per year in Y 1429.25 2,864.50 95,677.07 
`(Expected) waiting cost in X for a barge € 1,576.25 € 788.96 € 23.69 
`(Expected) waiting cost in Y for a barge
 
€ 2,086.15 
€ 1,044.53 € 31.38 
 
 
In Case 3, presenting increased market friction, (a lower φ ), we see an increase in waiting 
times in both locations X and Y. As the increase in waiting time in Y is higher, the impact on 
price pY is seen to be higher than the impact on pX. The increases in waiting times at both 
locations are as what might be expected, because more market friction means for barges and 
customers finding each other more difficultly. 
 
The results for Case 4 show that by almost removing market friction there are almost no 
waiting times. Thus Case 4 approximates the perfect competition model. As we are in 
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Equilibrium 2 zero waiting time means that the backhaul price (pY) goes to zero and the 
fronthaul (pX) goes to the round trip cost of transport.24  
 
4.3. Stronger imbalance in demand 
 
We present Case 5 and Case 6 to see how sensitive our outcomes are for variations in the 
balance between the two markets. NY is kept contant at 100 in this analysis, and NX is set from 
400 in the reference case to 800 and 1600 respectively. The results can be found in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Effects of variations in the demand imbalance related parameter NX  
Variable Reference Case Case 5 Case 6 
`NX     (exogenous) 400 800 1600 
`pX € 5,785.21 € 5,683.18 € 5,594.33 
`pY € 1,043.66 € 1,043.66 € 1,043.66 
`µY 0.1904 0.0829 0.0361 
`B 399.9346 869.5951 1,925.2275 
Waiting time for barges in X 1.9211 days 1.6727 days 1.4563 days 
Waiting time for barges in Y 2.5434 days 2.5434 days 2.5434 days 
Waiting time for customers in X 9.7120 days 8.4531 days 7.3575 days 
Waiting time for customers in Y 12.7509 days 12.7509 days 12.7509 days 
`Number of matches per year in X 15,043.20 34,567.39 79,429.15 
`Number of matches per year in Y 2,864.50 2,864.50 2,864.50 
`(Expected) waiting cost in X for a barge € 788.96 € 1,576.25 € 598.08 
`(Expected) waiting cost in Y for a barge
 
€ 1,044.53 € 2,086.15 € 1,044.53 
 
 
When analysing more imbalanced demand we see that most variables are either rather 
insensitive or are changed in order to take care for the increase in demand in X. The decrase in 
freight price in X, (pX), is explained due to our increasing returns to scale matching function. 
                                                 
24
 We should admit that a less attractive feature of our model is that, because waiting times become so short and 
in our model customers are immediately replaced, there is a very high number of realized matches. It is clear that 
our model is weakly explanatory for this kind of irrealistic short waiting times.  
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More demand means easier matches, lower waiting times, lower waiting cost and therefore 
lower freight prices. We also see a strong response by new customers entering the market in 
order to meet  the increase in demand. 
 
4.4. Different values of the transported good 
 
In this set of examples we try to measure the sensitivity of the reference case for the value of 
the transported good. The resulting output for this analysis can be found in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Effects of variations in the value of the transported good (parameter J) 
Variable Case 7 Reference Case Case 8 
`J     (exogenous) € 50,000 € 100,000 € 200,000 
`pX € 5,757.95 € 5,785.21 € 5,835.88 
`pY € 1,007.89 € 1,043.66 € 1,110.18 
`µY 0.1905 0.1904 0.1903 
`B 376.1499 399.9346 446.0249 
Waiting time for barges in X 1.8547 days 1.9211 days 2.0445 days 
Waiting time for barges in Y 2.4562 days 2.5434 days 2.7055 days 
Waiting time for customers in X 10.2381 days 9.7120 days 8.8464 days 
Waiting time for customers in Y 13.4358 days 12.7509 days 11.6223 days 
`Number of matches per year in X 14,270.22 15,043.20 16,515.15 
`Number of matches per year in Y 2,718.48 2,864.50 3,142.65 
`(Expected) waiting cost in X for a barge € 761.70 € 788.96 € 839.62 
`(Expected) waiting cost in Y for a barge
 
€ 1008.73 
€ 1,044.53 € 1,111.10 
 
 
All outcomes make sense. As there becomes more surplus available with an increasing value 
of the good, (a higher J), barges will in first instance also profit from surplus due to the 
bargaining process. However due to the free-entry condition more barges will enter until this 
positive surplus disappers. Nevertheless higher freight prices pX and pY result. With an 
increasing J, however, price pY rises faster than pX. This observation is related to the 
following. Due to the difference in scale, waiting times in Y are longer than in X, and when the 
value of the transported good is higher, the waiting costs are also higher. Since pY depends to a 
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much larger extent on waiting times than pX, the ratio of the two prices ( pX / pY )decreases 
when the value of the good increases. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we modeled the backhaul problem by means of a matching model in a two-way 
transport framework. We were motivated by the fact that competitive models did not explain 
positive backhaul prices in the circumstance of empty return trips of bargemen. In our setting 
positive backhaul prices, even under very highly imbalanced demand, may be attributed to 
costs due to waiting times (meaning the time for bargemen and transport demanding 
customers to find each other). While it could be argued that these could be added exogenously 
to the competitive model, the strength of our model is that waiting times are determined 
endogenously, and that we can perform analyses on how these waiting times change when 
certain essential input parameters for the model are changed. 
 
For our chosen parameter set, which was taken from the inland navigation market on the 
Rhine river, we first presented a one-way transport model. In this model we saw that the 
freight price was composed of both the transport cost for a barge and its cost of waiting. When 
we increased market friction we saw longer waiting times and therefore an increase in freight 
price. 
 
Then we presented the two-way transport model with which we studied backhaul pricing. 
Similar to the competitive model it turned out that we have to distinguish between two kind of 
equilibriums: (1) barges always sail full in both directions and (2) some barges sail empty 
back from the low demand region. Equilibrium (2) is the more interesting one from a backhaul 
pricing perspective and also from an empirical perspective. Indeed, in our chosen parameter 
set we always end up in Equilibrium (2). 
 
In Equilibrium (2) the round trip transportion cost is fully borne by the transport demanding 
customers in the high demand region. However, positive backhaul prices result due to 
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compensation demanded for waiting times (see Theorem). Hence, we succeeded in 
overcoming the above mentioned limitation of the competitive model. To study the sensitivity 
of the waiting times to a few essential parameters, we performed a comparative statics 
analysis. 
 
First we studied the effect of lower possible roundtips due to climate change, leading to higher 
trip durations. The interesting thing to note was that the customers, and therefore consumers, 
in the high demand region will pay for the increased costs of transport 
 
Secondly we analyzed different levels of market friction. We chose a case with increased 
market friction and a case with highly decreased market friction, almost resulting in the 
competitive model. The latter gave evidence of plausibility of our model. Increased market 
friction led to longer waiting times and therefore to higher freight prices. 
 
Thirdly we investigated the consequences of stronger imbalances in demand by increasing 
fronthaul demand and keeping backhaul demand constant. Backhaul prices turned out to be 
quite insensitive to this kind of demand increase. 
 
And fourthly we studied sensitivity to the value of the transported good. Increasing the value 
of the good means that the value of being in the market for the transport demanding customers 
increases. Due to the bargaining process more surplus would become available for the barges.  
However, due to free-entry this surplus is absorbed by a larger number of barge operators. 
Nevertheless higher freight prices result. 
 
We end with a few recommendations for further research. First it might be recommendable to 
allow barges to search for contact with customers while they are sailing. Secondly, a more 
realistic production process for transport demanding customers could be modeled. This makes 
an exogenous elasticity of demand possible, while we now have to be satisfied with the 
resulting outcome of the model. And thirdly, empirical research is needed to see whether our 
findings can explain empirical data. 
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Appendix A - Derivation of Price Equation (one-way) 
 
Solving the Bellman equations (2), (3) and (4) mentioned in section 2.2 gives 
 
λ
λ
+
−
=
r
tcWS
    (A.1) 
( )
qr
pJqV
+
−−
=
κ
    (A.2) 
θqr
p)-wcθq(SW
+
+
=
    (A.3) 
 
We again present the Nash-Bargaing rule from the main text, equation (6): 
 
 p = arg max (S - W + p)β(J – V – p)1-β.   
 
We proceed by taking the first-order condition:   
 
β (J – V – p) = (1 – β) (S – W + p).   (A.4) 
 
From the free-entry assumption, which implies W = 0, and substituting (A.1), (A.2) in 
(A.4), we get 
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Solving for p gives 
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After introducing w1 and w2, as well as Z1 and Z2, one obtains (7) in the main text. 
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Appendix B - Equilibrium Type 
 
We formulate the following 9 potential equilibrium situations in section 3.2: 
 
(1)  WX > SX  and  WY > SY   barges in X and Y never sail empty (Equilibrium 1) 
(2)  WX > SX  and  WY = SY barges in X never sail empty, but return sometimes empty 
from Y (Equilibrium 2) 
(3)  WX > SX  and  WY < SY one-way transport from X to Y 
(4)  WX = SX  and  WY > SY barges in Y never sail empty, but return sometimes empty 
from X (symmetrical to Equilibrium 2) 
 (5)  WX = SX  and  WY = SY cannot arise 
(6)  WX = SX  and  WY < SY cannot arise 
(7)  WX < SX  and  WY > SY one-way transport from Y to X 
(8)  WX < SX  and  WY = SY cannot arise 
(9)  WX < SX  and  WY < SY no market evolves 
 
Situation 3 and 7 are equivalent to the earlier analyzed one-way equilibrium. Situation 9 
means that no transport market evolves. So we discard this situation in further analysis. 
Situations 5, 6 and 8 cannot arise as some barges which sail empty all the time. So exit by 
barges will occur until this situation vanishes. Situations 1, 2 and 4 are all economically 
meaningful two-way outcomes. As situation 4 is symmetric to situation 2, we may 
assume NX ≥ NY and it suffices to analyse situation 1 and 2. 
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Appendix C - Proof of Theorem 1 
 
Theorem 1. 
In a matching model for a two-way market, the backhaul price pY will be strictly positive, 
when r / λ approaches zero. 
 
Proof. 
We will first show this for Equilibrium 2. In Equilibrium 2 it holds that WX > SX and 
WY = SY. This means that some bargemen return empty on their journey from Y. Substituting 
WX (= 0), SX, WY and SY into the four Bellman equations (10), (11), (12) and (13) for 
bargemen and solving gives: 
 
0 = – wc + θX qX ( SX  + pX) 
r SX = – tc + 2λ ( max ( WY, SY ) – SX ) 
r WY = – wc + θY qY ( pY ) 
r SY = – tc – 2λ SY 
 
This implies: 
 
XX
XX q
wcpS
θ
=+     (C.1) 
r SX = – tc + 2λ ( λ2+
−
r
tc
– SX )  (C.2) 
r WY = – wc + θY qY ( pY )   (C.3) 
λ2+
−
==
r
tcSW YY     (C.4) 
 
Solving (C.2) for SX gives:  2)2(
2
2 λ
λ
λ +−+
−
=
r
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r
tcS X    (C.5). 
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Substituting (C.5) in (C.1) gives:  
2)2(
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Substituting (C.4) in (C.3) gives:   
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The backhaul price 
YY
Y q
r
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θ
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=
 will now be positive under positive waiting times 
( 1 / θYqY ) under the condition that r / λ goes to zero. pY is now equal to the cost of waiting at 
Y, up to a small discounting effect. 
 
For Equilibrium 1, where WX > SX and WY > SY, the Bellman equations become: 
 
0 = – wc + θX qX ( SX  + pX ) 
r SX = – tc + 2λ ( WY – SX) 
r WY = – wc + θY qY ( SY – WY + pY ) 
r SY = – tc + 2λ ( – SY ) 
 
This implies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Combining (C.6) and (C.7) gives   YY
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WY has a negative value. Because of the assumption that WY > SY for Equilibrium 1 it follows 
that the backhaul price pY will at least be equal to the (nondiscounted) waiting cost wc / θY qY. 
Therefore also under Equilibrium 1 the backhaul price is positive. 
